expected from their titles. 7 Among continental writers, however, some attention has been paid to these issues. Gonzalo Puente Ojea, Louis Boisset, and Georges Casalis have examined the theological significance of Marxist critiques of ideology, while José Vives, Alfredo Fierro, François Houtart, Adolphe Gesché, Pierre Watté, and J. van Haeperen have considered more specifically how social formations and social thinking have been related to concepts and images of God. 8 Following the work of such anthropologists as Sheils and Underhill, Houtart and Gesché have adopted a somewhat static approach to the question, attempting, in a cross-cultural perspective, to relate the dominant conception of God in a community to the social structure of that community. They divide societies into two basic categories, those with a low degree of control over their environment and those with a high degree of control (Gesché), or, put slightly differently, those with a weak development in productive forces and those with a strong development of such forces (Houtart). The former type comprises kinship and feudal societies and the latter comprises capitalist and socialist societies. The dominant conceptions of God are said to be related to these structural differences. In social formations of the first kind (kinship and feudal), images of God are said to play a role in explaining and justifying natural and social phenomena to the believer, while in the latter formations (capitalist and socialist), religion has become "privatized" and the images used of God are to be seen primarily as responses to personal needs. Such analyses, however, lack a dynamic perspective; they fail to give sufficient emphasis to concrete and specific historical developments and to the way in which images and concepts of God which developed in one period of history frequently acquire a vitality of their own by means of which they may, on the one hand, persist into a later period or, on the other hand, provoke a reaction. By adopting a historical approach to the question, I believe that it is possible to allow for this relative autonomy which ideas, concepts, and images may attain.
Most historians of Christian doctrine have been concerned with what may be called the "internal" history of doctrine, in the sense that they have attempted to show how doctrines have been modified as a result of a logic and a dynamic deriving from the original revelation recorded in Scripture and in the traditions of the early Church. This internal history is thought to have been affected by three factors: by Christian experience (particularly the delayed Parousia), by ecclesiastical politics, and by changing philosophical frameworks adopted from the secular world. 9 The few attempts to write an "external" history of doctrine have been largely unsuccessful. The essay by Erich Fromm, The Dogma of Christ, suffers from a crude and dogmatic assumption about the social function of religion combined with an ignorance of history and theology. 10 The more interesting and suggestive book by Karl Kautsky, Der Ersprung des Christentums, published in 1921, founders on a rather simplistic attempt to account for developments in Christian doctrine as a function of the changing class composition of the early Church.
11
There is, nevertheless, a whole area for investigation which falls somewhere in between internal and external history. Models and paradigms developed in one discipline are frequently employed more or less consciously by writers in other fields of enquiry. Examples can be cited from the social Darwinists of the nineteenth century who consciously adopted models which had been employed in the field of biology.
12 Furthermore, 9 1 am thinking here not only of such English writers as G. L. Prestige, J. N. D. Kelly, M. F. Wiles, G. W. H. Lampe, and W. H. C. Frend (who lays considerable emphasis upon the importance of ecclesiastical politics in the development of doctrine) but also of German writers from A. Harnack to M. Werner. Gregory Baum has made this general criticism: "Theologians often tend to regard the variations of doctrine and theology simply as a development of ideas, without paying sufficient attention to the socio-political reality, of which this development is a reflection" ("Sociology and Theology," Concilium 1:10 [January 1974] 23). From what I say in the body of the article it will be clear that I believe the term "reflection" to be misconceived in this context. 10 Of his essay Fromm writes, "It will attempt to understand the ideas in terms of men and their life patterns, and to show that the evolution of dogma can be understood only through knowledge of the unconscious upon which external reality works and which determines the content of consciousness" 12 Nor, of course, was the influence one way. Darwin and Spencer were clearly influenced in their theories of biological evolution by the contemporary emphasis upon development and history, exemplified in the writings of Burke, Hegel, Coleridge, and Newman; see J.
as Mary Hesse has pointed out, "some factors which look purely causal and unconscious at first sight may on more careful inspection reveal intellectual and rational components." 13 It is in this context that I wish to explore the way in which ideas of God and the state have influenced each other, with particular reference to the thought of Leibniz. For too long a proper distinction between origin and validity has led to a false belief that the origin of an idea has no relevance to the question of its validity. Only by a study of the origins of an idea is it possible to understand the meaning of that idea, for the meaning is dependent upon the problem to which the idea is a solution or the question to which it is an answer. As it is possible to consider its validity only after having determined its meaning, familiarity with origins is a necessary preliminary to a consideration of validity.
II
Many of the images and concepts used about God are or have been applied also to political authority. Lordship, kingship, sovereignty, and power, judicial, military, and paternal images are all used in political and theological discourse. It is also the case that from earliest times the governing or predominant concept used about God has frequently been a feature of contemporary political rhetoric. Ideas of Yahweh as God of war, as king, as lawgiver appear to be related to Jewish social, and particularly political, structures. In classical Greek thought one of the principal characteristics of both God and the polis was autarkeia.
14 Perfection Was thought to involve self-sufficiency and, as God and the polis were the most perfect entities in their respective fields, they were thought of as autarkic. It is noteworthy that this strong emphasis upon self-sufficiency should emerge at a time when there was particular concern with the relationship between the small city state and the larger Greek community. The notion of perfection as involving self-sufficiency has had a long history, has rarely been absent from Western thought, and has had a powerful impact upon the development of Christian doctrine. It can be seen to emerge particularly strongly again in the period of early German nationalism, in the writings of Herder, Hegel, Schleiermacher, Fichte, and others, when once more the relation of the small state to the larger national unit was a matter of major concern. Nor is it purely coincidental that the notion of God's self-sufficiency has been challenged most vigorously by philosophers and theologians from the United States, where interdependence among the several units of the federation is a long-standing phenomenon.
15
Medieval conceptions of God and the state were manifestly characterized by hierarchy, order, and law, being summed up in the idea of lordship. In scholastic thought God was seen as the origin of the eternal law, which is the principle according to which all things are governed. This law was conceived as stemming from the very nature of God rather than as an arbitrary decree of His will. God cannot act against the eternal law, because to do so would be to act against His very nature and this would imply an imperfection. A thing is not lawful or just because God wills it; it is divinely willed because it is just. So too, in the political field, the ruler decreed positive laws, but if his decrees were contrary to the natural law (which is that part of the eternal law applying to rational beings) they were no longer truly laws. Laws were declared rather than made and were, according to Maitland, conceived as existing independently of the will of any ruler, independently even of the will of God.
16
Both God and the earthly ruler thus existed in a context of order based upon laws which they promulgated and administered but did not create.
17
The divine and the earthly monarchs were seen in the setting of a whole hierarchy, of angels and archangels on the one hand, of a feudal nobility on the other: 17 Except, that is, insofar as God willed the creation of the universe and can be said thereby to have willed the laws that apply to it; but these are not thought of as arbitrary commands of His will.
18 Peter Abelard's hymn "O Quanta Qualia."
With the gradual disruption of the feudal mode of production and social organization in the later Middle Ages, this conception of divine and political authority characterized by law was increasingly challenged, though its influence continued through the Reformation period among a number of writers; it was, as we shall see, to be used as the basis for a revival of natural-law conceptions in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nevertheless in the relatively disturbed years of the Renaissance and Reformation and into the seventeenth century a new conception of both God and the state emerged as predominant in Western Europe. This was the notion of divine and political authority characterized by will and command. Sovereignty is the distinguishing feature of God and of the king in their respective spheres. This view of authority may be found in the late Middle Ages among nominalist thinkers and was pioneered by claims made by such popes as Innocent III. It is present in Bodin, in the writings of King James I of England and in those of many of his critics, in Milton's prose and poetry, and above all in the thought of Thomas Hobbes. It is in the ideas of the latter that the notion of absolute sovereignty received its most radical formulation both in its religious and in its secular context.
Hobbist ideas of sovereignty led in turn to a number of different reactions which were themselves related to changing political circumstances in Europe. On the one hand, there was the attempt by a considerable number of writers to reintroduce restrictions on sovereignty by appealing to a refurbished conception of natural law. (I shall return to consider one such attempt, that of Leibniz, presently.) Another reaction was marked by a notion of God and the sovereign as detached from the day-to-day running of the world and of the realm: the divine architect and the "night watchman" state. A further type of reaction to Hobbist authoritarianism was distinguished by the acceptance of divine and human authority as absolute and unlimited, but combined with an attempt to ensure that this authority is exercised benevolently. This notion of authority, as power paternally exercised, emerged as predominant in the latter part of the nineteenth century in Western Europe; this was a period in which some of the harshest features of capitalism were present, together with a growing challenge to the economic and social .system on the part of the labor movement. The only way the capitalist state could avoid revolution was by mitigating some of the most brutal consequences of the system. In Germany and in Britain particularly, social legislation was enacted and the state adopted the pose of a "friendly society." 19 The paternalistic state was accompanied by a welfare conception of God, an image which is still of great influence today. God is thought of in terms of "caring and concern"; mercy and benevolence rather than justice or holiness are His principal characteristics. God and the state, in this welfare view, are to manage and manipulate men for their own good, an approach the working out of which may be seen in the fate of George Jackson, leader of the black "Soledad Brothers." Jackson was imprisoned at the age of eighteen, on a sentence of one year to life, for having driven the getaway car in a robbery in which $70 was stolen. The logic of the sentence was not that of justice but of social conditioning. An acceptance of the process of reformation-or, in this case, more accurately degradation-was the condition of release. His applications for parole were consistently turned down, and after having spent ten years in prison (seven and a half of them in solitary confinement) he was accused of killing a prison guard. 20 The idea of God which accompanies the growth of the welfare state is frankly assumed by the great German theorist of bureaucracy Max Weber. Discussing Calvin's view of God, he wrote: "The Father in Heaven of the New Testament, so turnan and understanding, who rejoices over the repentance of a sinner as a woman over the lost piece of silver she has found, is gone. His place is taken by a transcendental being, beyond the reach of human understanding." 21 The governing conception of God and the state is one of unlimited power combined with benevolence. It is clearly reflected in writings on the atonement in English from Rashdall to Lampe, where sin is seen as a personal affront to an omnipotent but indulgent grandmother who will forgive and forget at a whim. It is also assumed in the revised liturgies of the Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches, particularly in respect of the "God of power and might" who is nevertheless concerned with "the common good." The ideas of Leibniz on God and the state have to be seen against the background of the rise of the absolutist state and the associated growth of centralization in Western Europe. This particular form of the state was the product of a power equilibrium between the feudal aristocracy and the rising bourgeois class 24 and is best seen, in the words of Perry Anderson, as "a compensation for the disappearance of serfdom, in the context of an increasingly urban economy which it did not completely control and to which it had to adapt." 25 Rural discontent and mobility were such that no collection of individual landlords could hope to maintain order. Absolutism may be said to have done for feudalism what fascism on the one hand and the welfare state on the other have done for capitalism; the basic structure of the economic and social organization was maintained by political institutions having social corollaries that conflicted in certain respects with that structure and bringing with them political theories uncongenial to the system they were calculated to preserve. France and England were the countries in which centralization had proceeded furthest and it is no accident that it was in these countries that theories of state sovereignty received their most trenchant formulations, with publicists such as Bodin and Hobbes. Jean Bodin's theory of sovereignty both in its early version and in its classic form is closely related to his ideas about the nature of divine authority. He believed that the universe is presided over by a transcendent God, "that most mighty king, in unity simple, in nature indivisible," 26 who works through the ministry of demons. His notion of God is "intransigently monotheist" and there is little place in his system for a Trinitarian view of God. 27 The king is, for Bodin, the living image of God, governing his earthly domains after the pattern of the heavenly. 28 There is one father in a family, one head of a human body, so nature demands a single monarch in a state. 29 As God punishes the wicked through the medium of angels and spirits, so the king delegates to magistrates au- thority to punish transgressors of the civil law. 30 The principal mark of sovereignty is power to impose laws on subjects without their consent, and law is nothing else than the command of the sovereign in the exercise of his power. 31 In his early Methodus adfacilem historiarum cognitionem of 1566, Bodin recognized that kings are in certain respects subject to law, 32 and even in his later more radical statement of the theory of sovereignty he placed certain limits on the right of the monarch. He is bound by the laws of God and of nature and cannot take the property of another without just and reasonable cause. 33 Yet the principal achievement of the Six livres de la république was the removal of effective constitutional limits on the power of the monarch, combined with a rejection of all ideas of legitimate resistance to his commands. Thomas Hobbes's notorious attempt to strengthen absolutism by basing it upon consent is well known and need concern us here only insofar as it contributed to the ideology which Leibniz rejected. Hobbes identified justice with the command of the sovereign even more evidently and consistently than did Bodin. With respect to God, His doing of a thing makes it just and His right of sovereignty derives from His unlimited and irresistible power. 34 As His right derives from His power, so our obligation to obey derives from our weakness, or rather from the recognition of our weakness. 35 Hobbes strongly emphasized the uriity of God and put forward a distinctly "economic" interpretation of the Trinity, in which any real distinctions between the three Persons of the Godhead were rejected, a position which Bramhall perceptively criticized. 36 The office of the earthly sovereign is conceived by Hobbes on the analogy of the heavenly. to distinguish between religion and superstition. 38 As God is eternal, so Leviathan, the mortal god, enjoys an "artificial eternity, ,, in order that civil society will not dissolve into a state of war at the death of a monarch. 39 Sovereign power in civil society is indivisible; it must be held by one man or body of men, preferably by the former (because the world was created by one God, and other forms of government are "but pieces of broken monarchies cemented by human wit"). 40 Yet, although the earthly sovereign is conceived on analogy with God, he is of course in certain respects quite different from God and is not, strictly speaking, irresistible. If there had been a man (or body of men) whose power were irresistible, he might properly have ruled by the authority he derived from such power; 41 the absence of this kind of power led to the creation of sovereignty by consent.
Hobbist theology, political and civil, proved unacceptable even in England. "The English possessing classes," observes C. B. Macpherson, "did not need Hobbes's full prescription," and turned to "the more ambiguous and more agreeable doctrine of Locke." 42 If Hobbism was inappropriate in England, it was even less likely to be attractive to Germans. From the late fifteenth century onwards, efforts had been made by successive Holy Roman Emperors to achieve a degree of central control similar to that gained by English and French monarchs, but to little effect. An orderly and stable Germany would be achieved, if at all, by a federal system of government based upon respect for a law which transcended the positive law of each of the units. 43 This situation is clearly reflected in the writings of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (often spelled "Leibnitz"), who was born in Leipzig in July 1646. After studying law, he began a varied career as diplomat, student, librarian, engineer, and advisor to various heads of state. He died in 1716. Leibniz was a patriot who was manifestly concerned with the well-being of Germany. Next to honoring God, he wrote, the virtuous man will pursue the welfare and glory of his fatherland. "The bond of language, customs, yes even that of a common name," he pronounced, "unites men in a very strong, even though invisible, fashion and makes them in a way relatives." 44 In his political and theological writings Leibniz theories of absolute authority, divine or human. He fully accepted the analogy between God and the civil magistrate which his adversaries drew, but firmly rejected the notion that authority must be conceived in terms of despotic power. Acknowledging the fact that power is one of the valid constituents of authority, he insisted that this power must be exercised in accordance with law and justice. As God acts in conformity to eternal principles of right, so the king must govern in conformity to natural justice. God, like the good king, is benevolent and wished to maximize welfare by bringing into existence the best of all possible worlds. Unlike the earthly bureaucrat, however, God knows all, foresees all, and is therefore able to arrange everything so that the best is not only sought but realized. Leibniz's famous essay Theodicy is an elaborate attempt to vindicate the goodness of an all-powerful and omniscient God in face of the evil and pain that is found in the world. A constant concern in his theological and political writings is with order and harmony. As God's government of the universe manifests order, so must the king's government of his realm; as the divine economy provides for the reconciliation of apparently conflicting forces, the civil authority must rule by principles of accommodation, seeking always to conciliate clashing interests on the international and domestic fronts.
Gaston Grua has convincingly and exhaustively shown how Leibniz conceived of God as operating within a structure of law. 45 According to Leibniz, this fundamental law is a consequence of God's understanding, and he assailed Descartes for suggesting that the eternal truths of metaphysics and geometry as well as the fundamental moral law are to be ascribed to God's will. The works of God as found in the universe are really good and not simply for the formal reason that God has made them. 46 Goodness and justice have grounds independent of will and power. 47 Leibniz rejected the Hobbist view of God, outlined above, which "despoils God of all goodness and of all true justice". By ascribing to God a power which is essentially unrelated to justice, Hobbes represents him as a tyrant. 48 most perfect wisdom," 49 and he rejected the idea that God is characterized by Machtwille-an unrestricted will to power. 50 Furthermore, the justice which is ascribed to God is of the same kind as the justice which is expected from men; the term is used univocally and Leibniz would have sympathized with John Mill's strictures on Sir William Hamilton and his disciples for their equivocal use of moral terms when applied to God and man. "Universal right," the German philosopher maintained, "is the same for God and for men." 51 This principle is, of course, one of the basic assumptions of the Theodicy.
For Leibniz, then, God is to be thought of not as "an absolute prince employing a despotic power."
52 Nevertheless, the model he follows is that of "enlightened despotism," as we would call it today. God is thought of as a monarch who is absolute and sovereign without being arbitrary. 53 He is a sovereign monarch in the sense that He is the sole ruler of the universe, sharing His authority with none and subject to the will of none. 54 Although, as I have emphasized, Leibniz rejected the idea that God is characterized hfy naked power, he does insist that God is omnipotent. In an early dissertation he went so far as to define God in terms of "infinite power," 55 while in his later writings power is said to be one of the perfections that God possesses. 56 Power is, in itself, good; other things being equal, it is better to possess it than not. Power becomes a certain good, however, only when it is united with wisdom and benevolence, as it is in God. 57 In conformity to his principle of sufficient reason, according to which nothing occurs in the world without a sufficient reason accounting for it, Leibniz also maintained that God cannot act independently of reasonable motives 58 and he rejected the suggestion of Samuel Clarke that the sufficient reason for God's action can be "the mere will of God." 59 "A mere will," he replied, "without any motive is a fiction, not only contrary to God's perfection, but also chimerical and contradictory." 60 Elsewhere, however, when dealing with the question why God created Adam, he replied: because God chose to do the most perfect thing. In response to the further question, why God chooses or wills the most perfect thing, he replied that God wills it freely, that is, because He wills to; "so He willed because He willed to will and so on to infinity." 61 This position of the 1680's is not, though, typical of his mature thought. The freedom of God which Leibniz was here concerned to assert is exercised by His acting according to His eternal nature, which is not to be conceived of as a limit on His freedom. The motives according to which He acts incline without necessitating. Leibniz' insistence on the role played by will and freedom in God is due to his belief in the personal nature of the Divinity, which implies some concept of will.
62 He assailed those who make of God a metaphysical being without thought, will, or action, which is equivalent to identifying Him with nature, the world, or fate. "God," he continued, "is a definite substance, a person, a mind." 63 It is therefore surprising to find Leibniz called a pantheist or a panentheist.
64
As J. M. Gabaude has pointed out in a suggestive article, the God of Leibniz is to the Cartesian God as the wise and enlightened monarch is to the despot. 65 Despite his vigorous criticism of arbitrary government, Leibniz is, as I have already noted, an apologist of "enlightened despotism." In his day, he claimed, there was no prince so bad that it would 58 not be better to live under him than in a democracy. 66 Whether Leibniz took the divine government as a model which the earthly ruler should emulate, or whether he projected on to God a conception of civil government of which he approved, is a question to which I shall return. Ideally the monarch would relate to his realm as God relates to the universe; they both exist within a situation of order, and conduct their government according to principles of justice which are "founded in the immutable nature of things." 67 In the best state the monarch possesses power sufficient to put into effect his good will, 68 and even in the imperfect states that actually exist it is important that rulers should not have their hands tied, "for this makes them incapable of providing for the needs of the state quickly enough." 69 Nevertheless, to say, as many would, 70 that "it is not power, but the bad use of power which is worthy of blame" would, he maintained, be an oversimplification. It is dangerous, even for a virtuous ruler, to establish powers and rights which are "subject to corruption" in the hands of his successor. 71 The justice required of a monarch, like the justice of God, involves retribution. As God leaves nothing without its just reward or punishment 72 and has arranged things in such a way that "all virtue produces its (own) reward and that all crime punishes itself sooner or later," 73 so in a perfectly governed state each good or bad action must have its appropriate recompense. 74 General happiness is thought of being entirely compatible with justice, though it should not be assumed that the ruler's concern for the whole should lead him to neglect the interests of the parts. In a well-regulated commonwealth things are arranged as far as possible to the interests of individual citizens; so God in His government of the universe takes the good of individuals into account insofar as this may be done without disturbing the universal harmony. 75 Leibniz* notion of "compossibility," according to which certain goods are incompatible and cannot exist together in any possible universe, 76 enables him to assert that even in the best possible arrangement of things the absolute good of each component may be unrealizable.
God and the monarch are thus both concerned with maximizing the happiness or welfare of their subjects. Unlike the latter, however, God has perfect knowledge. He "has foreseen every thing; He has provided a remedy for every thing beforehand." 77 Leibniz made this point in the context of his dispute with Samuel Clarke. The German philosopher had argued that the Newtonian theories involved an unsatisfactory notion of God's relationship to the universe according to which He needs to "wind up His watch" from time to time to keep it going. "Nay, the machine of God's making is so imperfect, according to these gentlemen, that He is obliged to clean it now and then by an extraordinary concourse, and even to mend it." His own theory, in contrast, according to which the same force remains in the universe passing from one part of matter to another, restricted the intervention of God to the sphere of grace rather than to that of nature. Newton told Richard Bentley that he had composed his scientific works with "an eye upon such principles as might work with considering men for the belief of a Deity"; 78 Leibniz dismissed this "god of the gaps." He also rejected Newton's monolithic conception of Goda pantocrator characterized by dominion, power, and will. Leibniz, with his strong Trinitarian doctrine of a God who works according to the eternal laws of His nature, found the Newtonian position unacceptable. Clarke responded to this challenge by arguing that the notion of the world as a great machine, which he ascribed to Leibniz, is materialistic and fatalistic, finding no place for an idea of God's providence or government. Clarke then elaborated the political analogy. "If a king," he wrote, "had a kingdom, wherein all things would continually go on without his government or interposition, or without his attending to or ordering what is done therein; it would be to him, merely a nominal kingdom, nor would he in reality deserve at all the title of king or governor." Those who would contend that government can proceed perfectly well without the active participation of the king, he went on, might well be accused of wishing to get rid of him altogether. So the Leibnizian view of God which asserts that "the causes of the world can go on without the continual direction of God, the Supreme Governor," tends to "exclude God out of the world." 79 Leibniz took up Clarke's political analogy. God's kingdom is not a nominal kingdom, because He continually maintains the world in being. It is like saying that "A king, who should originally have taken care to have his subjects so well educated, and should, by his care in providing for their subsistence, preserve them so well in the fitness for their several stations, and in their good affections towards him, as that he should have no occasion ever to be amending any thing among them; would be only a nominal king." 80 We find here and elsewhere in Leibniz' writings a manifest concern for welfare as a proper end of civil government, as it is of God's government of the universe, "where nothing is neglected, where every hair on our head is counted." 81 In civil society the poor must be furnished with a means of livelihood, agriculture must be developed and vocational training organized. Conscience, honor, duty, and interest unite in obliging the ruler to combat poverty in his realm, and it is his duty to aim at "making his subjects happy." 82 As a recent commentator observes, Leibniz' concern for welfare combined with his bureaucratic authoritarianism "anticipates a good deal of later, German practice; some of Bismarck's domestic policies might not have been uncongenial to him"; The God of Leibniz, as Gabaude has pointed out, seeks to maximize productivity by obtaining the greatest possible variety, wealth, and abundance in the universe at the lowest cost. 84 This theme has been developed at length by Jon Elster, who sees Leibniz' God as modeled upon the rational entrepreneur of an emerging capitalism, who aims at maximizing net good rather than gross good by a cost/benefit approach. 85 The Leibnizian conception of God is, in Elster's view, an anticipation rather than a reflection of a capitalist system which was only nascent in Germany at this time, and he admits that Leibniz' own activities in the explicitly economic field frequently assume a mercantilist view of things. 86 Leibniz did not, as far as I know, himself develop the analogy between the pluralist state and the Trinitarian God, it is clear from his general way of thinking that each conception was related to his notion of unity in community, as indeed was his passionate desire for the unity of the Church.
For Leibniz, then, as for many thinkers before and after him, there is a close analogy between divine and political authority, between God and the state. If it is the case that God is to the universe as the ideal ruler is to his realm, we may properly ask which side of the analogy is thought to be known and which side is being illuminated. At times Leibniz seems to say: You know how God rules the universe, this is how the monarch should govern his realm; 95 at other times: You should "envisage God as the sovereign monarch of the universe, whose government is the most perfect state that one can conceive." 96 In one of his works, A System of Theology, Leibniz maintains both positions in the space of two pages.
97
Undoubtedly he would say that each side of the analogy illuminates the other, as does St. Paul in his analogy of the relationship between man and woman in marriage to the relationship between Christ and the Church. 98 One interpreter sees his conception of God as "the idealist projection and justification of the king," 99 while another suggests that his conception of the kingdom of God provides a model for the earthly kingdom.
100 When the former states that God is a projection of the king, it is certainly not the king as he actually is but as he ought to be. Leibniz one of the reasons he wanted to see a federal Europe presided over by an enlightened despot was that it mirrored a traditional conception of God which he endorsed. IV I have suggested in the very general historical section (II above) that there is frequently a close connection between images or concepts of divine and civil authority. In a more detailed consideration of Leibniz that followed (section III) I have illustrated some of the subtle ways in which this connection works itself out in the thought of a major European writer. Elsewhere I hope to show that Leibniz is but one example of this tendency to conceive of God and the state fulfilling an analogical role in relation to their respective realms. In this article I have dwelt mainly on how this analogy has been developed by intellectuals, but it is also possible to trace the way it has been employed, more or less consciously, in such popular forms of communication as hymns, sermons, newspapers, and pamphlets. It is also interesting to note that analogical thinking on this pattern frequently has consequences which are strikingly different from, and sometimes opposed to, the conclusions of logical or univocal thinking. For example, some radical publicists of the seventeenth century, adopting the latter mode of thought, argued that if God is king of the world, then monarchs and magistrates are, like other men, mere subjects of the heavenly king and cannot legitimately make claims to divine right.
The relationship between concepts of God and the state on the one hand and the relationship between these concepts and the concrete historical situation in which they emerge as predominant on the other is complex. While it is clear that the political and religious institutions with which people live will strongly influence their political and religious experience respectively and that the form this experience takes will in turn affect in a significant way the principal concept they use about God and the state, it is also true that these concepts themselves affect developments at the institutional level. It should be noted that concepts of God influence the development not only of religious but also of political institutions (as illustrated by the way paternalistic concepts of God have reinforced the legitimacy of the welfare state), just as concepts of the state influence ecclesiastical as well as governmental developments (for example, the post-Reformation emphasis upon state sovereignty manifestly encouraged Erastian developments in Church polity). Furthermore there would appear to be mutual influence at the conceptual level, frequently conscious (as in the case of Leibniz and many of his contemporaries), though sometimes unwitting.
Two final remarks are appropriate. If the position I have been maintaining is true, it would be foolish of politicians and bureaucrats to ignore the governing concepts of God which are entertained by the population of their state, for such concepts may be used as legitimations of, or as threais to, the institutions these men represent. Ecclesiastics would likewise be well advised to acknowledge the importance of concepts and images used of the state. Or, to put the point in a slightly different way, the conclusions of this article imply the possibility of a political critique of the images of divine authority and a theological critique of the state.
Secondly, I have in the course of this article been concerned with predominant or governing concepts. Minorities within both Church and state, holding different or opposed ideas, have always existed, and it is not the case that their dissent can be understood as a simple function of their social class. Also I have spoken of "influence" and "affect" rather than of "determine" and "cause" when discussing the relationship between concepts and inétitutions. Use of the latter terms by some sociologists of knowledge would have implications that render the question of the validity of these concepts irrelevant to ask and impossible to answer. An English writer has recently suggested that the theological Cinderella should seek a new dancing partner in the sociology of knowledge. 101 The dance, however, is not (as Professor Nineham assumes) a "lady's invitation"; theology must come to terms with the sociology of knowledge willynilly. Yet theology would be well advised to be on her guard against the suffocating embrace of this Prince Charming; otherwise at daybreak we may find ourselves confronted with an academic pumpkin!
